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We explore the impact of mutual altruism among the players belonging to the same set – their tribe – in a
partition of all players in arbitrary strategic games upon the quality of equilibria attained. To this end, we
introduce the notion of a τ -tribal extension of an arbitrary strategic game, in which players’ subjective cost
functions are updated to reflect this, and the associated Price of Tribalism, which is the ratio of the social
welfare of the worst Nash equilibrium of the tribal extension to that of the optimum of social welfare. We
show that in a well-known game of friendship cliques, network contribution games as well as atomic linear
congestion games, the Price of Tribalism is higher than the Price of Anarchy of either the purely selfish
players or fully altruistic players (i.e. ones who seek to maximise the social welfare). This phenomenon is
observed under a variety of equilibrium concepts. In each instance, we present upper bounds on the Price of
Tribalism that match the lower bounds established by our example.
1 INTRODUCTION
According to the standard narrative around the concept of Nash equilibrium, one of its great con-
tributions is that it shed light on why multi-agent systems in the real world often “race to the
bottom”, or otherwise fail to exhibit behaviour anywhere near the social optimum. Perhaps fortu-
nately, the picture suggested by the theory is not always reflected in real-world systems, which
often appear to stabilise in states that are better than self-interested Nash equilibria. On the other
hand, many a carefully designed political and economic system fails to deliver on its theoretical
promises in reality.
Beside the “spherical cow” class of model-reality disagreements such as computational limita-
tions and insufficient rationality of the agents, the good half of this discrepancy is often rationalised
by saying that players exhibit a degree of altruism – that is, they seek to optimise not just their
own welfare but some weighted combination of it with the sum of the welfare of all players. This
approachmay partially explain the more favourable dynamics we observe. However, recent results
[CKK+10, CdKKS14] demonstrate that in some cases, altruism can give rise to equilibria that are
even worse than those that exist if all players are purely self-interested.
Once identified, this might not seem that unrealistic: for instance, all historical industrial revolu-
tions, implemented by arguably selfish agents seeking to maximise profit, were accompanied by a
temporary dip in social welfare [Szr04]. A society whose members are altruistic but do not coordi-
nate may therefore never have implemented these changes, remaining stuck in the pre-industrial
local optimum without electricity, mass production or modern medicine.
Looking at the workings of the lower bounds for “altruistic anarchy”, we find that the ways in
which altruistic players get stuck in local optima appear quite different from those enabling bad
selfish equilibria. Could it then be that there are realistic settings in which both mechanisms occur
together?
Tribalism and political polarisation are often argued to be a feature of human interactions that
predates those interactions even being, strictly speaking, human at all, but according to newsmedia
and sociological analyses alike, their impact on public life in Western societies has been steadily
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increasing [Eco17, CRF+11, FA08, BB07]. A tribalistic agent, broadly speaking, is concerned with
the welfare of other agents belonging to the same tribe, rather than the overall social welfare of
everyone participating in the system. A game or system in which the agents are tribalistic, then,
could be said to exhibit both altruism (within a tribe) and selfishness (in how the tribes interact
with each other). Inspired by the failure of real-world systems, we set out to investigate if this
mixture of altruism and selfishness could in fact lead to even worse outcomes than either altruism
or selfishness alone.
We find that this is indeed the case. In the following sections, we will show that tribalism leads
to a greater Price of Anarchy than either altruism or selfishness in a folklore model of friend
cliques, network contribution games [AH12] and atomic linear routing games [Ros73b]. In each
case, we also present upper bounds for the tribal Price of Anarchy that match the lower bounds
demonstrated by our examples.
2 MAIN RESULTS
2.1 Definition of tribalism
Our definition of games in which the players exhibit tribalism is designed to resemble the defi-
nition of α-altruistic extensions that [CdKKS14] make for their analysis of universal altruism. An
analogous definition can be made for utility-maximisation games.
We will represent cost-minimisation gamesG as the triple (N , (Σi )i ∈N , (ci )i ∈N ), where N is the
set of players, Σi are the strategies available to player i and ci (s) is the cost for player i when the
vector of strategies chosen by all players is s ∈
∏
i ∈N Σi . We will use (t ; s−i ) to denote the vector
s with player i’s entry replaced with t .
Definition 2.1. Suppose G = (N , (Σi )i ∈N , (ci )i ∈N ) is a finite cost-minimisation game.
Let τ : N → N be a function that assigns each player a unique tribe, identified by a natural
number. The τ -tribal extension of G is the cost-minimisation game Gτ = (N , (Σi )i ∈N , (cτi )i ∈N ),
where the cost experienced by every player is the sum of costs of all players in the same tribe in
the original game: for every i ∈ N and s ∈ Σ = Σ1 × · · · × Σn ,
cτi (s) =
∑
j∈N :τ (i )=τ (j)
c j (s).
When the partition function τ is constant, our definition agrees with the one in [CdKKS14] with
α = 1, and we say the players are (fully) altruistic. When τ (i) , τ (j) for all i , j , Gτ = G and we
say the players are selfish.
We then define the Price of Tribalism for a class of games G and class of partition functions
{TG }G ∈G as the supremum of ratios between the social welfare CG (s) =
∑
i ∈N ci (s) of any Nash
equilibrium of any τ -tribal extension for τ ∈ TG and the social optimum, i.e. the lowest attainable
social cost. In other words, the PoT captures how bad a “tribal equilibrium” can get for any game
in G and any pattern of tribal allegiance of the players therein.
The definition for utility-maximisation games is again analogous.
Definition 2.2. The pure (resp. correlated, strong, mixed...) tribal Price of Anarchy (Price of Trib-
alism, PoT) of a class of games G and class of partition functions for each game T = {TG }G ∈G to
be
PoT(T ,G) = sup
G ∈G,τ ∈TG
sup
s∈SGτ
CG (s)
infs∈ΣCG (s)
,
where SGτ is the set of pure (correlated, strong, mixed...) Nash equilibria of Gτ .
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Game PoA Altruistic PoA PoT
Social grouping game
with 2 cliques
2 (folklore) 2 (Thm. 4.2) 3 (Thm. 4.3)
Social grouping game
with k cliques
k (Thm. B.1) k (Thm. B.1) 2k − 1 (Thm. B.2)
Network contribution
with additive rewards
1 [AH12] 1 ([AH12], Cor. 4.5) 2 (Thm. 4.6)
Network contribution
with convex rewards
2 [AH12] 2 (Thm. B.3) 4 (Thm. 4.7)
Atomic linear routing 5/2 [CK05, AAE13] 3 [CKK+10] 4 (Thm. 4.8)
We can control the tribal structures that we want to consider by choosing an appropriate class T
of partition functions. We will denote the class of all functions which sort the players into exactly
k tribes by
T
(k)
G
= {τ : |τ (N )| = k}, and that of all possible functions as T (∗)
G
=
⋃∞
i=1 T
(k)
G
. The Price of
Anarchy given full altruism (i.e. in the gameG1 of [CdKKS14]) then equals PoT(T (1),G).
2.2 Impact of tribalism on known games
We first consider a folklore game which is often invoked as a simple model of friendship. This
game can be seen as a special case of the party affiliation game of [FPT04], with positive payoffs
only. Players choose to associate with one of two cliques A and B. Each pair of players has an
associated utility of being friends ui j , which they can only enjoy if they choose to associate with
the same clique. For this game, a folklore bound we revisit shows that the pure Price of Anarchy
is 2.
Theorem 2.3. (4.2; 4.3; B.2) The pure Price of Anarchy for the social 2-grouping game F2 under
full altruism satisfies
PoT(T (1),F2) = 2
as well. However, the pure Price of Tribalism is
PoT(T (∗),F2) = 3.
More generally, in the social k-grouping game (i.e. with k cliques) with at least k tribes Fk ,
PoT(T (1),Fk ) = k and PoT(T
(∗)
,Fk ) = 2k − 1,
while the pure Price of Anarchy is k .
A more involved model of friendship networks was first described by Anshelevich and Hoefer
[AH12]. In the network contribution gameNF , we are given a social graph of vertices representing
players and edges representing potential relationships between them. Each player has a fixed bud-
get bi , which they seek to allocate among the edges adjacent to them. They then receive a payoff
from each edge based on a symmetric function fe (x ,y) = fe (y, x) ∈ F of their own and the other
player’s contribution to that edge.
In the original paper, the authors show different bounds on the Price of Anarchy for this game
depending on the form the functions fe can take: among others, for fe (x ,y) = ce (x + y) (we call
this class of gamesN+), they show a PoA of 1, and when fe (x ,y) satisfies fe (x , 0) = 0 and each fe is
convex in each coordinate (denoted byNC ), the PoA is 2. Moreover, instead of pure Nash equilibria,
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they invoke pairwise ones, which are resilient against any pair of associated players deviating
together. In the presence of tribalism, we demonstrate that both of these bounds deteriorate.
Theorem 2.4. (4.6; 4.7; B.3) The pure and pairwise Price of Tribalism for the network contribution
game with additive rewards is
PoT(T (∗),N+) = 2.
The pure and pairwise Price of Tribalism for each of the network contribution games with coordinate-
convex reward functions is
PoT(T (∗),NC ) = 4.
Meanwhile, the altruistic Price of Anarchy is still 1 forN+ and 2 for NC .
Finally, we will turn our attention to atomic linear routing games R [Ros73a], a popular class
of games that model a set of players seeking to each establish a point-to-point connection over a
shared network (such as the internet or roads) represented by a graph, where the cost to all players
using an edge increases linearlywith the number of players using it. In the case of selfish behaviour,
these games are well-known to exhibit a pure Price of Anarchy of 5/2 [Ros73a]. Caragiannis et al.
[CKK+10] show that in the case of universal altruism, this deteriorates to PoT(T (1),R) = 3. We
showmatching lower and upper bounds that demonstrate that in the face of tribalism, significantly
worse equilibria can arise. It should be noted that in fact, our result applies to the more general
class of atomic linear congestion games.
Theorem 2.5. (4.8) The Price of Tribalism for the atomic linear routing game is
PoT(T (2),R) = PoT(T (∗),R) = 4.
3 BACKGROUND
The Price of Anarchy [KP99] is a widely used tool for analysing the behaviour of systems com-
posed of autonomous agents pursuing their rational self-interest in the absence of a central coordi-
nation mechanism. However, the assumption of pure selfishness is at odds with observed human
behaviour and what is predicted from evolutionary biology; social scientists have conducted ex-
periments and offered simple models for altruism [Led94, Lev98].
This observation inspires a well-explored line of inquiry
[CKK+10, CK08, CdKKS14] into how players caring about social welfare affects the Price of
Anarchy. In [CKK+10], the players of an atomic linear congestion game are taken to behave altru-
istically on a spectrum from zero to one: 0 being purely selfish, 1/2 corresponding players trying
to maximise social welfare and 1 making players “totally selfless”, so that they optimise for every-
body’s utility except their own. Surprisingly, it is found that altruism actually often leads to higher
prices of anarchy than if the players behaved selfishly.
We draw heavy inspiration from the subsequent treatment by [CdKKS14], which applies a sim-
ilar construction to a broader set of games.
The authors of this work introduce the notion of an α-altruistic extension of a given game, where
each player i has an associated altruism parameter αi . The ith player’s cost is defined as a com-
bination of (1 − αi ) times their individual utility and αi times the social welfare, so a value of 0
represents selfishness while 1 corresponds to full altruism. (Unlike [CKK+10], [CdKKS14] do not
consider selfless players.) When αi = 1 for all i , this corresponds to our notion of tribalism with
every player belonging to the same tribe; however, we do not consider the possibility of partial
altruism in the sense of a parameter α strictly between 0 and 1.
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Many authors [HTW06, AFM07, FKS08, CCM09, BGL+11] have studied how various forms of
“group behaviour” can affect the Price of Anarchy. Of these, [HTW06, BGL+11] consider the ratio
between the worst Nash equilibrium of the modified game to the worst selfish equilibrium (con-
trast to our ratio between the worst modified Nash and the social optimum), and only look at
specific games (congestion games in [HTW06] and load balancing games in [BGL+11]). The Price
of Collusion defined in [HTW06] in particular is closely related to the instantiation of our defini-
tion for those games, with PoC ≤ PoT ≤ PoA · PoC. In [AFM07, FKS08, CCM09], the groups are
taken to be able to coordinate their actions (unlike ours), but (with the exception of [CCM09]) not
share costs (so players are still selfish).
Much of the aforementioned work implicitly or explicitly assumes altruism to be a phenomenon
that mostly occurs locally in tightly-knit groups, where it is reasonable to assume that players who
care for each other’s welfare can also coordinate their actions and deviate from a strategy together.
We generally think of tribes as entities in which, due to scale or other impediments, coordination
between individuals is not possible (contrast with e.g. [CEPJ09], where the groups vote on their
next action), though some of our results on coordinated Price of Tribalism in network contribution
games show that bad equilibria can persist even when individuals in a tribe coordinate. We con-
tend that this is a reasonable assumption: human political and religious groups rarely possess any
sort of central coordination mechanism (small cells or action groups that do act in concert could
easily be merged into a single “superplayer” to be considered in our setting), and there are natural
examples such as state-forming insects like bees and ants where non-coordination is implied by
the absence of a communication system rich enough to express the breadth of actions available to
each individual. (Cues that are known to be used for some degree of coordination, such as scent
markers, can be modelled as part of the game’s payoff structure.)
A different strain of work that is based on the idea that altruism is a local phenomenon dates back
to [KLS01]. This paper considers games in which the players’ perceived utilities are only affected
by their own and those of their neighbours in the social graph, representing a geographic or social
proximity that leads individuals to be concerned with each other’s utility. Related lines of work
extend the social graph to model various other relations between players such as information
about each other’s actions and preferences (e.g. [BFFM11, BFFM10]). The social graph may be
taken to be closely related to some graph structure present in the underlying game, as in the
disease spread model of [MOSW08], or on the contrary to be completely independent, as in the
social context games introduced in [AKT08]. The latter, in particular, turn out to be a strictly more
general model than the one considered in this paper: each player is made to minimise a fixed
function of the costs experienced by themselves and all their immediate neighbours in the social
graph (called social context graph by [AKT08]).
A τ -tribal extension can be seen as a social context game where the social graph consists of a
disjoint collection of cliques, i.e. complete subgraphs that are not connected to each other, and the
aggregator function is a sum.
Although the model is on the surface quite general,
it has been found to exhibit a good amount of exploitable structure: for example, [RS13] defines
smoothness for social context games, which generalises the original definition of [Rou09].
[HS12] tightly characterises which potential games remain potential games under all social con-
texts. One such example are atomic linear routing games, which we consider in Section 4.3.
Several authors [BCFG13, Bil14, ABH12] explore how the Price of Anarchy behaves in this more
general setting, which enables still more mechanisms to construct games with bad equilibria – for
instance, player’s concern need no longer be transitive, so player A can seek to reduce the cost of
player B and player B that of player C without player A having any concern for player C’s cost.
Relevantly, [BCFG13] demonstrates a lower bound and upper bound of 17/3 for atomic linear
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Fig. 1. Le: An OPT/2 selfish equilibrium. Right: An OPT/3 tribal equilibrium.
congestion games with social context given by a general graph, which in our setting (i.e. when the
graph is a collection of disjoint cliques) have a matching lower and upper bound of 4. Due to the
generality of the social context model, we consider our model to be of independent interest.
4 EXAMPLES
4.1 Social grouping games
A simple folklore example of a game with nontrivial and clearly suboptimal Nash equilibria is the
social (k-)grouping game. In this game, the players are nodes of a directed graph, with edgeweights
ui j ≥ 0 to be thought of as the benefit a friendship between players i and j would give player j . We
can assume the graph to be complete, with previously absent edges having weight 0. In general, we
do not assumeui j = uji , but both our lower and upper bounds satisfy this assumption. Each player
must declare their membership in one of two, or more generally k “cliques” or “friend groups”, and
receives utility ui (s) =
∑
j :s(i )=s(j) uji , that is, the sum of benefits from all other players in the same
clique.
Here, we will focus on the lower bounds 2-clique case; for the fully general version of these
theorems and proofs of the upper bounds, see Appendix B.1.
It is not hard to see that in this game, it is optimal for everyone to declare membership in the
same clique, therefore being able to reap the benefits of all possible friendships. However, there
exist locally optimal pure Nash equilibria that fall short of the optimum by up to a factor of two.
The following theorem is known to us from private communication with Éva Tardos.
Theorem 4.1. The pure Price of Anarchy for the social 2-grouping game is 2.
This circumstance does not changewhen players are fully altruistic, and in fact, the lower bound
is established by the following Nash equilibrium in the same example as seen for the preceding
theorem.
In Fig. 1 on the left,
we see that by switching to the other clique, each player would gain (from the unique player that
benefits them in the other group) 1 unit of utility, and lose (from the unique player that benefits
them in the current group) 1 as well. Also, the net loss to the rest of the community (as the person
sharing the clique with the switching player would no longer benefit from their friendship) and
the net gain (as one person in the clique they are switching to would now benefit) each are 1 as
well, and so switching would indeed make no difference to the player’s subjective utility. On the
other end, we can establish a matching upper bound with little effort.
Theorem 4.2. The Price of Tribalism for the social 2-grouping game and constant partition func-
tions τ ∈ T (1) is 2.
What happens once different tribes enter the picture? In the above example, the player’s own
loss
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due to lost friends was neatly cancelled by gained benefit due to newly gained friends, and
likewise the loss to the community was cancelled by the gain experienced by the members of the
defector’s new peer group.
With multiple tribes, we no longer have to make a putative defector value the gains and losses
of all other players equally.
How much worse could we make the equilibrium by making the player care about the friends
he is currently in a clique with, but wouldn’t care about the benefit he could bring to the members
of the other clique?
The defector would have to value the benefit to himself of the other group’s friendship higher
than the sum of the benefit to himself of his current group’s and the benefit his current group
derives from him. Therefore, the foregone friendship of those who are in the other clique could
be worth up to twice as much to the player before he is incentivised to switch: if we mark the
members of one tribe red and the members of the other tribe blue, the choice of cliques shown in
Fig. 1 on the right
is pure Nash. Here, each player would gain 2 by defecting, and their tribe would gain 0; at the
same time, they would lose 1, and their community would also lose 1, and so defecting is zero-sum.
This example turns out to be tight for 2-grouping, regardless of how many tribes we allow the
players to belong to.
Theorem 4.3. The Price of Tribalism for the social 2-grouping game and arbitrary partition func-
tions τ ∈ T (∗) is 3.
Proof. The above example shows a lower bound. For the upper bound, derive from the Nash
condition summed over all players:∑
i
∑
j :s(i )=s(j)
uji +
∑
i
∑
j :
s(i )=s(j)
τ (i )=τ (j)
ui j ≥
∑
i
∑
j :s(i ),s(j)
uji +
∑
i
∑
j :
s(i ),s(j)
τ (i )=τ (j)
ui j
∑
i
∑
j :s(i )=s(j)
uji +
∑
i
∑
j :
s(i )=s(j)
τ (i )=τ (j)
ui j ≥
∑
i
∑
j :s(i ),s(j)
uji
2
∑
i
∑
j :s(i )=s(j)
uji
(∗)
≥
∑
i
∑
j :s(i ),s(j)
uji
3
∑
i
∑
j :s(i )=s(j)
uji ≥
∑
i
∑
j :s(i ),s(j)
uji +
∑
i
∑
j :s(i )=s(j)
uji
=
∑
i
∑
j
uji = U (s
∗),
where (∗) is as all summands are non-negative and relaxing the restriction only adds more terms:∑
i
∑
j :s(i )=s(j)
ui j ≥
∑
i
∑
j : s(i )=s(j)
τ (i )=τ (j)
ui j .
As the sum on the LHS is just the social welfare at Nash, this completes the proof. 
The above argument can be extended to show that k tribes are in fact always strictly worse than
k − 1 whenever there are at least k distinct friendship cliques to be formed; see Theorem B.2.
To the extent to which the social grouping game is a useful model of real-world social networks,
we see this result as confirmation of an intuitively relatable phenomenon: when individuals “fall
in with the wrong crowd”, they can get stuck in local minima that are quite bad for everyone.
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4.2 Network contribution games
A more involved model of social relationships are the network contribution games N described by
Anshelevich and Hoefer [AH12]. We model a social graph in which the vertices represent players
who can divide up a personal budget of effort Bi ≥ 0 among their potential relationships, rep-
resented by edges. The benefit each player derives from a relationship e = {i, j} is given by a
non-negative, non-decreasing and symmetric reward function fe : R2≥0 → R≥0 in terms of the
amount of effort each of them invests, and each player’s total utility is just the sum of benefits
from all relationships.
In the original paper, players are both allowed to deviate individually if it benefits themselves
and to coordinate a joint deviation with a neighbouring player if it benefits them both; this is both
seen as more realistic for pairwise relationships, and necessary to enable interesting defection pat-
terns for some classes of payoff functions to exist at all. We will follow this approach in the tribal
extension, calling deviations by single players and connected pairs unilateral and bilateral respec-
tively. We will denote an equilibrium stable against bilateral deviations as a pairwise equilibrium,
giving rise to a pairwise Price of Tribalism. Furthermore, we note that all lower-bound examples in
this section work even when entire tribes are allowed to coordinate their deviation; we will call
the corresponding PoT coordinated.
Definition 4.4. Some notation for the rest of this section.
(i) Denote by si (e) the amount that player i contributes into edge e in strategy s.
(ii) For each edge e = {i, j}, letwe (s) = fe (si (e), sj (e)) be the reward that the edge pays to both
i and j .
(iii) An edge e = {i, j} is called tight in strategy s if si (e) ∈ {0,Bi } and sj (e) ∈ {0,Bj }, and a
strategy s is tight if all edges are tight.
When the reward is just a weighted sum of investments, [AH12] shows that the PoA is 1. It is
easy to establish that this is also the case when players are altruistic.
Corollary 4.5 (of Theorem 2.8 in [AH12]). PoT(T (1),N+) = 1.
Proof. The socially optimal strategies are just those where each player puts all of their budget
onto the edge adjacent to them with the largest reward. For each player, this is also the locally best
strategy for maximising social welfare, since their contribution to social welfare is just two times
the portion of the reward that is due to their own budget. 
However:
Theorem 4.6. Suppose all reward functions are of the form ce (x +y), where ce > 0. Then the pure,
pairwise and coordinated PoT each is PoT(T (∗),N+) = 2.
Proof. As noted in the proof of Theorem 2.8 in [AH12], the social optimum s∗ is attained when
all players invest their entire budget in the respective adjacent edge e∗ with maximum ce . For a
configuration s to be a Nash equilibrium, no player may want to deviate to investing their budget
like this. If a player i invests si (e) units into an adjacent edge e ∼ i , their tribe earns 2si (e)ce units
of utility if the player on the other end is also in the same tribe, and si (e)ce units otherwise. So∑
e∼i 2si (e)ce ≥ Bice∗ . Summing over all players, we find that
U (s) =
∑
i
∑
e∼i
si (e)ce ≥
1
2
∑
i
Bice∗(i ) = U (s
∗),
and so the PoT is bounded above by 2. 
Proof (lower bound). A tight lower bound is given by the following graph:
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2(x + y) (x + y)
Here, the two players on the right are in the same tribe, but only the middle player has any budget.
It would be socially optimal for them to invest this in the edge on the left, attaining a social welfare
of 4; however, the configuration where they instead invest in the edge on the right – yielding a
social welfare of 2 – is stable, since the blue tribe’s total utility is 2 regardless of how the middle
player’s budget is allocated. 
When all reward functions are convex in each coordinate, [AH12] shows a PoA of 2. In Theorem
B.3, we show that this is also the case given altruism. Again, though, tribalism leads to deteriora-
tion.
Theorem 4.7. Suppose all reward functions are convex in each coordinate. Then the pure, pairwise
and coordinated Price of Tribalism each is PoT(T (∗),NC ) = 4.
Proof (upper bound). By Claim 2.10 in [AH12], since all reward functions are coordinate con-
vex, we can assume that the optimum s∗ is tight. Fix a pairwise tribal Nash equilibrium s. Note that
we can normalise the fe ’s so that fe (0, 0) = 0. Since the reward functions are non-decreasing, the
normalised functions will still be valid reward functions, and subtracting a constant from utility
at both OPT and Nash can only increase their ratio.
In a tight strategy, each player can invest their budget in at most one edge. When a player i
invests in an edge e in the optimum solution s∗, we will say that i is a witness to e . Let e = {i, j} be
an edge where s∗i (e) = Bi and s
∗
j (e) = Bj , so i and j are both witnesses to e . By the Nash condition,
if i and j were to bilaterally deviate to their strategies in s∗, then it must not be beneficial for at
least one of the two players’ tribes. Suppose WLOG that this is i . In the worst case, i and j were in
the same tribe and benefitting other members of their tribe, and so the tribe loses 2(ui (s) + uj (s)).
On the other hand, the worst-case gain occurswhen i and j are in different tribes, and so the switch
only benefits i’s tribe
one lot of we (s∗). So by the Nash condition, we can derive
uτi (s) ≥ u
τ
i (s
∗
i ; s
∗
j ; s−i, j) ≥ u
τ
i (s) − 2(ui (s) + uj (s)) +we (s
∗).
Rearranging the inequality, we have 2(ui (s)+uj (s)) ≥ we (s∗). Sowe (s∗) is less than two times the
sum of the utilities of its witnesses in s. So suppose instead e = {i, j} is an edge where s∗i (e) = Bi
and s∗j (e) = 0, so only i is a witness to e . By the same reasoning as above, we have
uτi (s) ≥ u
τ
i (s
∗
i ; s−i ) ≥ u
τ
i (s) − 2ui (s) +we (s
∗).
So again,we (s∗) is less than two times the sum of the utilities of its witnesses in s.
Since each player is marked as a witness to exactly one edge, we can sum the above inequalities,
treating one side as a sum over all edges and the other as a sum over all players. We thus conclude
U (s∗) = 2
∑
e
we (s
∗) ≤ 4
∑
i ∈V
ui (s) = 4U (s). 
Proof (lower bound). The following example in fact provides amatching lower bound for any
function class that contains a coordinate convex function f satisfying f (x , 0) = 0 and is closed
under scalar multiplication.
1 1 1 1 1 1
εf f (
1
2 + ε )f εff
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The social optimum, with welfare 4f (1, 1), is attained when the four players in the middle invest
their budgets in the respective adjacent edge with payoff f . However, we can show that the con-
figuration in which all budget is invested in the first, third and fifth edge, for a total payoff of
(2ε + 1 + 2ε + 2ε)f (1, 1), is stable against unilateral, bilateral and whole-tribe deviations: No set
of players who are in the same tribe will want to deviate, as this would involve diverting budget
from an edge that has investments on both ends (thus losing utility) to one that has no investment
on the other end (thus not gaining any). Also, the two (distinct-tribe) players at the second and
fourth edge in the graph will not want to deviate together, because this will not benefit the blue
tribe player closer to the center: supposing they divert b units and the red player diverts a units
to their shared edge, we have
f (a,b) + 2(1/2 + ε)f (1, 1 − b) < 2(1/2 + ε)(f (1,b) + f (1, 1 − b)) < 2(1/2 + ε)f (1, 1)
by non-decreasingness and coordinate convexity. 
4.3 Atomic linear routing games
Atomic linear routing games were first defined in [Ros73a], and their prices of anarchy were first
studied in [STZ07] in the context of asymmetric scheduling games; an exposition of this is given
in [Rou16]. In these games, each player i is associated with a pair of vertices (si , ti ) of a directed
graph, called its source and sink respectively. We think of the game as modelling multiple players
traversing a road network, incurring some delays along the way depending on the total congestion
on each road segment traversed. In the linear case, these delay functions are assumed to be linear,
so each edge e is associated with a positive factor αe such that when k players are on the edge
, each of them incurs a delay of αek (and hence the sum of their delays is αek2). Formally, the
strategies available to player i are the set of paths from si to ti in the graph, and the cost incurred
by the player is ci (s) =
∑
e ∈si αe#{j : e ∈ sj }.
By [CK05, AAE13], the pure Price of Anarchy for atomic linear routing games is exactly 52 . In
[CKK+10], a weaker upper bound of 3 is shown to hold if players are at least partially altruistic
(optimising some convex combination of their own utility and social welfare), and this bound is
tight when players are fully altruistic. We will demonstrate that this bound does not hold when
players show tribal altruism towards two or more tribes. The example that gives rise to our lower
bound relies on tribal behaviour that is quite intuitive: at certain interior nodes (case 1 below), a
tribally altruistic player prefers to continue paying a greater cost (while also causing a great cost
to an “outgroup” member) over switching to a configuration that would benefit both the player
and the commons, but result in a greater cost being paid by the player’s tribe.
The matching upper bound uses smoothness.
Theorem 4.8. The Price of Tribalism for atomic linear routing games R with 2-tribe partition
functions τ ∈ T (2), as well as arbitrary partition functions in T (∗), is
PoT(T (2),R) = PoT(T (∗),R) = 4.
Proof (lower bound). Our construction is inspired by the construction in [CKK+10].
As in that paper, our example will be formulated not as a routing game, but as a specific load-
balancing game in which each player (represented as an edge) can choose between one of exactly
two “servers” or congestible elements with linear cost functions (represented as the endpoints of
the edge). This representation can be converted back into a routing game by the following scheme:
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f (x)
д(x)
i 7→ si ti
f (x)
д(x)
For every k , we will now construct a gameGk and describe a tribal Nash sk .
The game is played on a binary tree with k + 1 layers of nodes (and hence k layers of edges).
Unlike the construction of [CKK+10] (Thm. 2), we do not require to introduce additional edges
below the tree, since the costs in the layers of our construction decay fast enough that the total
weight of the final layer is dominated by the rest of the tree.
We set the delay function of the nodes at depths (distances from the root) i = 0, 1, . . . ,k−1 to be
fi (x) = (1/2)
i x . The cost of the nodes in the final layer shall instead be twice that of the preceding
layer: fk (x) = (1/2)
k−1 · 2 · x .
Each of the two players (edges) under a node shall belong to different tribes, say the left edge
to tribe 1 and the right edge to tribe 2.
The overall construction will then look like this:
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
1x
1
2x
1
4x
1
8x( 1
2
)k−1
x( 1
2
)k−1
· 2 · x
We claim that the strategy profile sk in which every player-edge chooses to occupy the “upper”
(closer to the root) vertex is Nash.
Indeed, by analysing the environment of each edge depending on the layer it is situated in, we
can verify the Nash condition for all players.
(1) Intermediate layers, up to exchange of tribes:
cx
1
2cx
In this case, at Nash, the top red player incurs a cost of
1c · 2 + 12c2 = 3c (for himself on the two-player node
above, and his tribesman on the two-player node below).
If he were to switch down, his cost would be 0 + 12c3 · 2
, which is also 3c .
(2) Final layer, up to exchange of tribes:
cx
2c · x
In this case, at Nash, the red player incurs a cost of 2c , as
nobody is using the bottom node and he is sharing the
top node with a player from the other tribe. If he were to
switch down, he would be using the node alone, but his
cost would still be 2c .
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Summing by layer, the total cost of this assignment then is
CGk (s
k ) =
k−1∑
i=0
4 · 2i ·
(
1
2
)i
= 4k .
Here, the cost factor due to congestion on each vertex is red, and the number of vertices in each
layer is blue. The cost factor on each vertex is black.
On the other hand, the social optimum is at least as good as the strategy (sk )∗ where every
player uses the node further “down” (away from the root). In this assignment, every vertex except
for the root is occupied by exactly one player, so the cost of the optimum is bounded above by the
total cost
CGk (opt) ≤ CGk ((s
k )∗) =
k−1∑
i=0
1 · 2i ·
(
1
2
)i
−1︸︷︷︸
root
+ 1 · 2k
(
1
2
)k−1
· 2︸              ︷︷              ︸
bottom-most row
= k − 1 + 4.
Hence we can conclude that as k →∞, the ratio between the cost of the Nash equilibrium and the
social optimum goes to 4 from below: that is, for any ε , there is a k such that
CGk (s
k )
CGk (opt)
≥
4k
k + 3
≥ 4 − ε
as claimed. 
In order to establish the upper bound (which holds for any number of tribes), wewill first need to
introduce an appropriate instance of the common notion of smoothness, originally due to Rough-
garden [Rou09]. Broadly speaking, a smooth game is one in which in expectation, a unilateral
deviation towards a different strategy profile moves the deviating player’s welfare towards some
multiple of its welfare in the target profile. This property can be used to deduce a generic bound
on the Price of Anarchy.
Definition 4.9. LetGτ be the tribal extension of a finite cost-minimisation gameG .G is (λ, µ, τ )-
smooth if for any strategy profiles s, s′ ∈ Σ,∑
i ∈N
(
cτi (s
′
i ; s) − (c
τ
i (s) − ci (s))
)
≤ λC(s′) + µC(s).
Other work in the literature on altruism and social context uses generalisations of smoothness.
Of particular note is Chen’s notion of (µ, λ,α)-altruistic smoothness [CdKKS14] and Rahn and
Schäfer’s SC-smoothness [RS13]. Our definition agrees with Roughgarden’s when τ assigns each
player to his own tribe, and with (µ, λ, 1)-altruistic smoothness when τ assigns all players to the
same tribe; it also turns out that SC-smoothness is a straightforward generalisation.
Theorem 4.10 ([RS13]). Let G be a class of games and T = {TG }G ∈G be a class of partition
functions for each game. If for every G ∈ G and τ ∈ TG , G
τ is (λ, µ, τ )-smooth, then PoT(T ,G) ≤
λ/(1 − µ).
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Proof. Fix a G ∈ G and τ ∈ TG . Let s be a tribal Nash equilibrium of gameGτ . Then
C(s) =
∑
i ∈N
ci (s) =
∑
i ∈N
(cτi (s) − c
τ
i (s) + ci (s))
≤
∑
i ∈N
cτi (s
∗
i ; s−i ) − (c
τ
i (s) − ci (s))
≤ λC(s∗) + µC(s),
where the first inequality follows from the tribal Nash condition. Since this is true for all games
and partitions, we have PoT ≤ λ/(1 − µ). 
The following bound,which is in the spirit of several similar ones in the literature (e.g. [CdKKS14]
Lemma 4.4), will be a key ingredient in the proof to follow.
Lemma 4.11. For integers x ,y ≥ 0, x(y − x) + xy + x + y ≤ 83y
2
+
1
3x
2
.
Proof. We will equivalently show that
2xy + x + y ≤
8
3
y2 +
4
3
x2.
Let f (x ,y) = 2xy + x + y, д(x ,y) = 83y
2
+
4
3x
2. We have
f (x , 0) = x and f (0,y) = y;
also,
д(x , 0) =
4
3
x2 and д(0,y) =
8
3
y2,
and so it is easy to verify that for all such pairs, f (x ,y) ≤ д(x ,y) as required. Using this as the base
case, observe now that
f (x + 1,y + 1) − f (x ,y) = 2x + 2y + 4
≤ д(x + 1,y + 1) − д(x ,y) =
8
3
(2y + 1) +
4
3
(2x + 1) =
16
3
y +
8
3
x + 4
for all x ,y ≥ 0. So if f (x ,y) ≤ д(x ,y), then f (x + 1,y + 1) ≤ д(x + 1,y + 1). Thus, we can derive
the inequality for all (x ,y) ∈ N2 inductively. 
Lemma 4.12. LetGτ be a τ -tribal extension of an atomic linear routing game. ThenGτ is (8/3, 1/3, τ )-
smooth.
Proof. Let s and s∗ be two strategy profiles in any τ -extension of any atomic linear congestion
game. We will use ne (s) = #{i | e ∈ si } to denote the number of players using edge e in strategy s,
and nte (s) = #{i | e ∈ si , τ (i) = t} be the number of players on edge e that belong to tribe t . Then
cτi (s) =
∑
e αen
τ (i )
e (s)ne (s). For each player i , we can compute the change in cost of i’s tribe as she
switches from s to s∗,
cτi (s
∗
i ; s−i ) − c
τ
i (s) =
∑
e ∈s∗
i
\si
αe ((n
τ (i )
e (s) + 1)(ne (s) + 1) − n
τ (i )
e (s)ne (s))
+
∑
e ∈si \s
∗
i
αe ((n
τ (i )
e (s) − 1)(ne (s) − 1) − n
τ (i )
e (s)ne (s))
≤
∑
e ∈si∗
αe (n
τ (i )
e (s) + ne (s) + 1) +
∑
e ∈si
αe (1 − n
τ (i )
e (s) − ne (s)).
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Here, the last inequality is becausewe can add the (always positive) contribution of edges e ∈ si∩s∗i .
Then, substituting into the left hand side of Definition 4.9 and using that ci (s) =
∑
e ∈si αene (s), we
find that ∑
i ∈N
(cτi (s
∗
i ; s−i ) − c
τ
i (s) + ci (s))
≤
∑
tribes t
∑
i ∈N :τ (i )=t
©­«
∑
e ∈s∗i
αe (n
t
e (s) + ne (s) + 1) +
∑
e ∈si
αe (1 − n
t
e (s))
ª®¬
=
∑
tribes t
∑
edges e
αe
(
nte (s
∗)(nte (s) + ne (s) + 1) + n
t
e (s)(1 − n
t
e (s))
)
by changing the order of summation and combining the nte (s
∗) (resp. nte (s)) identical summands
on each edge; this is
=
∑
tribes t
∑
edges e
αe
(
nte (s)(n
t
e (s
∗) − nte (s)) + n
t
e (s
∗)ne (s) + n
t
e (s
∗) + nte (s)
)
≤
∑
edges e
αe (ne (s)(ne (s
∗) − ne (s)) + ne (s
∗)ne (s) + ne (s
∗) + ne (s))
by summing over tribes and using nte (s) ≤ ne (s) (as the tribes are a partition of all players using
edge). By Lemma 4.11, we conclude that this is
≤
∑
edges e
αe
(
8
3
ne (s
∗)2 +
1
3
ne (s)
2)
)
=
8
3
C(s∗) +
1
3
C(s). 
Proof (upper bound of Thm. 4.8). Follows from Lemma 4.12 and Thm. 4.10. 
The proof goes through unchanged for general atomic congestion games with linear costs.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the concept of a τ -tribal extension of a given strategic game G and used it
to define the Price of Tribalism, a measure of the badness of possible equilibria when players are
altruistic among each other within groups and indifferent towards members of other groups. By
means of three different examples, we have demonstrated that inmany cases, the Price of Tribalism
can be worse than either the corresponding measure when players are completely selfish or when
they are completely altruistic. While we have mostly focused on scenarios in which the members
of a tribe cannot coordinate their actions, our analysis of the network contribution game shows
that this can still be the case even when full coordination at the tribal level is in fact possible.
While all examples giving rise to our lower bounds were based on the idea that a player would
be willing to forego a deviation beneficial to themselves and the commons for the local benefit of
their tribe, it remains an open question how generally this intuition can give rise to lower bounds
on Price of Tribalism that beat known upper bounds on the pure Price of Anarchy. For some games,
such as the opinion-forming game of [BKO11], we suspect that even though tribalism gives rise to
new equilibria, those are never worse than the ones that arise from selfishness. Future work will
focus on investigating other games and identifying general conditions that are sufficient for the
Price of Tribalism to exceed the Price of Anarchy.
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A GENERAL MISCELLANEA
The class of equilibria we consider in the paper is an analogue of the standard notion of Nash
equilibrium:
Definition A.1. Given a finite cost minimisation game G = (N , (Σi )i ∈N , (ci )i ∈N ), s ∈ Σ is a pure
Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N and s′ ∈ Σ,
ci (s) ≤ ci (s
′
i ; s−i ).
Adapting this definition for the tribal extension simply requires us to change the cost function
that the players are now minimising.
Definition A.2. Given aτ -tribal extension of a finite costminimisation gameG = (N , (Σi )i ∈N , (ci )i ∈N ),
s ∈ Σ is a (pure) tribal Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N and s′ ∈ Σ,
cτi (s) ≤ c
τ
i (s
′
i ; s−i ).
One can define tribal mixed equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and coarse correlated equilib-
rium in exactly the same way. In this paper, we will focus on pure equilibria, which already exhibit
interesting differences in the presence of tribes.
The Price of Anarchy [KP99] is a standard notion for measuring the inefficiency of selfish be-
haviour for classes of games.
Definition A.3. Let G be a class of finite cost-minimisation games with social cost functions CG
for eachG ∈ G. The Price of Anarchy of G is
PoA(G) = sup
G ∈G
sup
s∈SG
CG (s)
CG (s∗)
,
where SG is the set of pure Nash equilibria ofG .
This definition is frequently madewith the set of strategy profiles SG to be compared against the
optimum as an explicit parameter, in which case the standard Price of Anarchy is obtained with
the appropriate set of pure Nash equilibria of G , whereas the Price of Tribalism is obtained when
the set of all tribal equilibria under all possible partition functions,
⋃
τ ∈T SGτ , is used instead.
We can note some basic observations about the PoT that follow immediately from its definition.
Proposition A.4. (Basic facts)
(1) If TG ⊆ T
′
G for all G ∈ G, then PoT(T ,G) ≤ PoT(T
′
,G). Hence PoA(G) ≤ PoT(T (∗),G).
(2) If the functions τ ∈ TG map each player to a distinct tribe for allG (i.e. i , j ⇒ τ (i) , τ (j)), then
the resulting tribal extensions are equivalent to the original game, and so PoA(G) = PoT(T ,G).
(3) If the class of games G is closed under some means of adding players whose cost/utility is always
zero, then for any k < k ′, any NE in a tribal extension with k tribes corresponds to an NE of
same value in a game with k ′ tribes where the additional k ′ − k tribes consist of zero players,
and hence PoT(T (k),G) ≤ PoT(T (k
′)
,G).
B MISSING PROOFS
B.1 About social grouping games
Theorem B.1. The selfish and altruistic Price of Anarchy of k-grouping games are both k .
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Proof. In this proof, we will use the notation s(i) = c for player i choosing clique c in strategy
s, and any unspecified sums over c or c ′ will be over all cliques and i, j over all players. Recall that
the social welfare for a strategy s is
U (s) =
∑
c
∑
i, j :s(i )=s(j)=c
uji ,
and the social welfare of the socially optimum strategy (all players choosing the same clique) is
U (s∗) =
∑
i, j
uji .
First, we will establish an upper bound on the selfish Price of Anarchy. Let s be a Nash equilib-
rium of a k-grouping game and fix a clique c . The Nash condition says that for all players i such
that s(i) = c and all cliques c ′, ∑
j :s(j)=c
uji ≥
∑
j :s(j)=c ′
uji .
Summing over all cliques c ′ and players i such that s(i) = c , we get
k
∑
i :s(i )=c
∑
j :s(j)=c
uji ≥
∑
i ∈c
∑
c ′
∑
j :s(j)=c ′
uji
k
∑
i, j :s(i )=s(j)=c
uji ≥
∑
i ∈c
∑
j
uji
k
∑
c
∑
i, j :s(i )=s(j)=c
uji ≥
∑
i, j
uji (by summing over cliques c).
This gives us that the Price of Anarchy is less than or equal to k .
The upper bound for altruistic PoA is very similar. The Nash condition for player i deviating
from clique c to clique c ′ is ∑
j :s(j)=c
(ui j + uji ) ≥
∑
j :s(j)=c ′
(ui j + uji ),
since player i now also cares about her effect on the other players, but her deviation does not affect
players not in cliques c or c ′. As above, sum over c ′, players i in clique c , then c , and obtain:
k
∑
c
∑
i, j :s(i )=s(j)=c
(ui j + uji ) ≥
∑
i, j
(ui j + uji )
2k
∑
c
∑
i, j :s(i )=s(j)=c
uji ≥ 2
∑
i, j
uji .
This gives us an upper bound of k once again.
For the lower bound consider the following game. Label the 2k players as {ai }ki=1 ∪ {bi }
k
i=1 and
define the utilities (edge weights) to be
uaibi = ubiai = 1 for all i
uaiaj = ubibj = 1 for all i , j
uxy = 0 otherwise.
Then consider a strategy swhere the cliques are {ai ,bi } for all i . This is a Nash equilibrium: when
a player p deviate to a different clique, they would lose one unit of utility from their old clique and
gain one from their new clique. This is also an altruistic Nash: when a player deviates, they lose
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two units of social welfare from the old clique and gain two in social welfare from the new clique.
Computing the social welfare of s and the social optimum, s∗, we get
U (s) = 2k U (s∗) = 2k(k − 1) + 2k = 2k2.
So the both the Price of Anarchy and the altruistic Price of Anarchy are k . 
Theorem B.2. The Price of Tribalism for social k-grouping games is exactly
PoT(T (∗),Fk ) = 2k − 1.
Proof. (Sketch) For the upper bound, the RHS of the first line in the proof of Theorem 4.3
becomes a maximum over the k − 1 possible alternative cliques that the ith player could join. So
if we multiply the inequality by k − 1, the RHS is an upper bound on∑
c,s(i )
∑
j :s(j)=c
uji =
∑
j :s(j),s(i )
uji .
The rest of the proof proceeds identically except for the additional factor of k − 1 on the LHS up
to the line marked (∗), resulting in a factor of 2k − 1 rather than 3 on the final line.
For the lower bound, use the same construction as the one from Theorem B.1 but with tribes
{ai ,bi }, for all i , and
uaiaj = ubibj = 2 for all i , j .
This strategy profile, s, is a tribal Nash equilibrium since a player’s tribe would lose utility 4 from
her leaving a clique, but gain 4 from her joining any other. The social welfare of s compared to
that of the optimum, s∗, is
U (s) = 2k U (s∗) = 4k(k − 1) + 2k = 4k2 − 2k .
This yields a Price of Tribalism of 2k − 1. 
B.2 About network contribution games
Theorem B.3. Suppose all reward functions are coordinate convex. Then the altruistic Price of
Anarchy is equal to 2.
Proof. The proof follows from the same reasoning as the one for tribalism, except for a few
computational differences. Since in all cases i and j are playing for the same “tribe”, the increase
utility received by j also must be counted into the utility of the group. So in the case of edge e
where s∗i (e) = Bi and s
∗
j (e) = Bj . We again mark i and j as witnesses for e , and have
U (s) ≥ U (s∗i ; s
∗
j ; s) ≥ U (s) − 2(ui (s) + uj (s)) + 2we (s
∗).
For e where si (e) = Bi and sj (e) = 0, we mark j have
U (s) ≥ U (s∗i ; s) ≥ U (s) − 2ui (s) + 2we (s
∗).
So we (s∗) is less than or equal to the utility of the witness of e in strategy s. Then we have
U (s∗) = 2
∑
e
we (s
∗) ≤ 2
∑
i ∈V
ui (s) = 2U (s).
The tightness of the upper bound can be shown with a simple example; consider a square graph
with four nodes {a,b, c,d} all with budget one, and four edges: e1 = {a,b}, e2 = {b, c}, e3 = {c,d},
and e4 = {d,a}. The reward functions are fe1(x ,y) = fe3 (x ,y) = (1−ε)xy and fe2 (x ,y) = fe4(x ,y) =
1
2xy. The arrangement that maximises social welfare is the one with each node investing their
whole budget into the incident edge with payoff (1 − ε)xy. In this strategy, the social welfare is
4(1− ε). However, the strategy where every player invests in their incident edge with pay-off 12xy
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is an altruistic Nash equilibrium. Any unilateral deviation is clearly not beneficial, losing social
welfare 2(1 − ε) for no gain. Bilateral deviations on e1 and e3 would lose society 2ε , and on e2 and
e4 would lose society 2(1 − ε) utility. This strategy gives social welfare 2, so the Price of Anarchy
is at least 2. 
C TRIBES COORDINATING
We briefly demonstrate how to interpret the approach of [CCM09] with definitions designed to
resemble our own.
Definition C.1. Let G = (N , (Σi )i ∈N , (ci )i ∈N ) be a finite cost-minimisation game with a social
cost functionCG .
Let τ : N → N be a function that assigns each player a unique tribe, identified e.g. by a natural
number. Then the acting players are the oligopolies themselves, with cost function being sum of
the cost of the players in the oligopoly. Specifically, the τ -oligopolistic extension of G
is the cost-minimisation game
oGτ =
τ (N ),

∏
τ (i )=t
Σi
 t ∈τ (N ) , (c
τ
t )t ∈τ (N )
 ,
where the cost experienced by each oligopoly is the sum of costs of all players in the same oligopoly
in the original game: for every t ∈ τ (N ) and s ∈ Σ = (
∏
τ (i )=t Σi )t ∈τ (N ),
cτt (s) =
∑
i ∈N :t=τ (j)
ci (s).
Definition C.2. Given a τ -oligopolistic extension of a finite cost minimisation game
G =
τ (N ),

∏
τ (i )=t
Σi
 t ∈τ (N ) , (c
τ
t )t ∈τ (N )
 ,
the strategy s ∈ Σ is a (pure) oligopolistic Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N and s′ ∈ (
∏
τ (i )=t Σi )t ∈τ (N ) ,
cτt (s) ≤ c
τ
t (s
′
t ; s−t ).
Definition C.3. The pure coordinated Price of Tribalism (PoT), or oligopolistic Price of Anarchy,
of a class of games G and class of partition functions for each game T = {TG }G ∈G to be
PoT(T ,G) = sup
G ∈G,τ ∈TG
sup
s∈SoGτ
CG (s)
infs∈ΣCG (s)
,
where SoGτ is the set of pure Nash equilibria of oGτ .
Theorem C.4. The coordinated Price of Tribalism for the social 2-grouping game is 2.
Proof. For the lower bound, consider the following configurations:
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a b
cd
A B
1
111
1
1
1
1
In this configuration each oligopoly has utility 4, and if either oligopoly move their players into
the same clique, they would continue to have utility 4. By symmetry, switching cliques of the both
players also doesn’t affect the utility. So the oligopolistic Price of Anarchy is at least 2.
For the upper bound, first consider a fixed oligopoly t . Let s = Σ1× · · · × ΣN → {0, 1} be a Nash
equilibrium assigning each member to a clique, and I0 = {x ∈ τ−1(t) : s(x) = 0} the members
of t who are in clique 0. Then by the Nash condition, we know that if t switches the clique of all
members in t of clique 0 to clique 1, it would only decrease the utility of t . Thus, we have∑
i :τ (i )=t
∑
j :s(j)=s(i )
uji ≥
∑
i :τ (i )=t∧i ∈I0
©­«
∑
j :s(i ),s(j)
uji +
∑
j∈I0
uji
ª®¬
+
∑
i :τ (i )=t∧i<I0
©­«
∑
j :s(i )=s(j)
uji +
∑
j∈I0
uji
ª®¬
where we assume thatuii = 0. If we repeat the same argument to τ−1(t)\ I0, and add it to the above
inequality, we get
2
∑
i :τ (i )=t
∑
j :s(j)=s(i )
uji ≥
∑
i :τ (i )=t∧i ∈I0
©­«
∑
j :s(i ),s(j)
uji +
∑
j :s(i )=s(j)
uji +
∑
j∈τ −1(t )
uji
ª®¬
+
∑
i :τ (i )=t∧i<I0
©­«
∑
j :s(i )=s(j)
uji +
∑
j :s(i ),s(j)
uji +
∑
j∈τ −1(t )
uji
ª®¬
Then for each oligopoly t , we have
2
∑
i :τ (i )=t
∑
j :s(j)=s(i )
uji ≥
∑
i :τ (i )=t
∑
j
uji (1)
Summing over t , we get 2C(s) on the left and C(s∗) on the right, so the oligopolistic Price of
Anarchy is at most 2. 
